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NOTES
EVIDENCE OF A REFUSAL TO RETRACT IN ACTIONS OF LIBEL
At common law a retraction of defamation could be a complete defense
only if made immediately after the utterance. The question as to whether
it was complete enough to negate the original utterance was one of fact
for the jury.' In action for slander, a refusal on the part of the defendant
to retract a statement of his when requested to do so by the plaintiff was
admissible as evidence of the defendant's actual malice. 2 In actions of
libel, a refusal to retract when requested was also admissible to show the
actual malice of the defendant,3 as was evidence of continued publication
of the libelous matter after a request for retraction.4 In these actions
express or actual malice must be found by the jury to have existed before
punitive damage can be awarded the plaintiff.5
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

An unreasonable delay

Trabue v. Mays, 3 Dana 138, 28 Am.Dec. 61 (Ky. 1835).
Klewin and another v. Bauman, 53 Wis. 244, 10 N.W. 398, 11 A.L.R. 674 (1881).
Thibault v. Sessions et al, 101 Mich. 279, 59 N.W. 624, 130 A.L.R. 858 (1894).
Crane v. Bennett, 77 App.Div. 102, 79 N.Y.S. 66 (1902); affirmed 177 N.Y. 106,
69 N.E. 274 (1905).
Stokes v. Morning Journal Association, 72 App.Div. 184, 76 N.Y.S. 429, 92 A.L.R.
1129 (1902).
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in printing a retraction may aggravate the damages. 8 Delay is a question
for the jury to decide as to what a reasonable time would be for the correction, after the defendant acquired knowledge of the falsity of the publication.¢ However, the publisher can show the delay was caused by acts of
the plaintiff in order to mitigate the damages. 8
In general, the common law rules on retraction and refusal to retract
have been codified in most jurisdictions with only slight changes by the
statutory law. The trend in these changes seems to follow the California
legislation in limiting the plaintiff's damages to actual damages, if the
libel was caused by some mistake on the part of the defendant, and actual
malice is not otherwise proved. The California statute limits the plaintiff's
damages to actual damages unless he can prove that he *requested a retraction be made by the defendant and the defendant has refused to
comply. 9 The statute which the State of Nevada has enacted is the most
modern in the field, going beyond retraction, it allows the plaintiff a right
of reply to any libelous matter in the form of a denial or correction. This
reply must be printed free of charge by the defendant and the statute
places criminal liability on him if he refuses to allow the plaintiff to
reply.' 0 The only Wyoming statute pertinent to the subject has a reply
feature which is limited to publication of reports of certain specified proceedings before legislative and judicial bodies. These reports are to be
privileged unless the plaintiff can prove that the defendant refused to
publish the plaintiff's explanation or contradiction, or the final outcome
of the proceeding after the plaintiff has requested they be published.',
It appears that Wyoming, because of the absence of statutes on the
subject, will follow the common law on the question of refused retractions.
The law on the subject can be broken down generally into two categories,
placing what is often called a duty on the defendant to retract (1) when
requested to do so by the plaintiff and (2) when there is no request by
the plaintiff.
When the plaintiff has asked the defendant for a retraction three
distinct problems arise; what constitutes a request, how much of the
request is admissible as evidence, and whether the defendant has a duty
to retract after a request has been made. The question sometimes arises
as to what constitutes a request for retraction. It has been held that a
letter which contained many self-serving declarations and a threat to sue
was not a request for a retraction. 12 The plaintiff cannot by telegram
request a meeting with the publisher to arrange for a retraction and have
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Bradley v. Cramer et al, 66 Wis. 297, 28 N.W. 372 (1886).
Ibid.
Lorimer v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 268 App.Div. 188, 49 N.Y.S.2d 234
rehearing denied 50 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1944).
Civil Code of the State of California §§ 48a (1941).
N.C.L. § 10506 (1931).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. §§ 3-8201, 3-8202 (1945).
Bird v. Press Publishing Co., 154 App.Div. 491, 139 N.Y.S. 88 (1913).

(1944).

NoTEs
the telegram admitted as evidence of a request for a retraction.18 Admission into evidence of an alleged request for retraction, and which is in
14
fact not such, may be reversible error.
As to how much of the request for a retraction is admissible into
evidence, the courts have usually held that only as much of it as is
pertinent to the actual retraction request itself is admissible. Self-serving
declarations in a letter sent by the plaintiff's attorney to the defendant
were held inadmissible, and only such of the letter as pertained to the
actual request for retraction were admissable.' 5 The plaintiff cannot have
a request for a retraction of more things than he is entitled to have
retracted admitted into evidence. 16 A request sent by registered mail
which has been returned unclaimed cannot be given in evidence, but the
envelope is evidence of a refusal to communicate with the plaintiff on
the part of the defendant. 17 If the defendant stipulates at the trial that
there was a request for .retraction, the request will not be shown to the jury
unless the plaintiff can prove that it was the same one that reached the
defendant. 18
It has been stated that the defendant has a duty to publish a retraction
A refusal to retract by the publisher will warrant
when it is requested.1
a jury in finding that he acted with a wanton disregard to the rights of
the plaintiff, which is sufficient for them to award the latter exemplary
damages. 20 However, it was held in a case where the plaintiff brought suit
against the owner and publisher of a newspaper, that the defendant could
not be charged with the malice evidenced by the refusal of one of his subeditors to publish a retraction requested by the plaintiff. 2 1

The court, by

way of dicta, indicated that had the defendant himself refused to make
the retraction the jury might have found that to be actual malice.2 2 This
appears to be the majority rule followed today in the absence of statutes
on the question. Some statutes, such as the Florida statute, place a time
limit on the defendant in which he must publish the retraction after notice
28
of the libelous article is given to him by the plaintiff.

When there has been no request for a retraction, the courts must
decide whether a request must be made before malice can be shown and
whether evidence of a retraction can be admitted in mitigation. Generally,
when a person is libeled, he need not make a request for a retraction in
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Farr et al. v. Bramblett et al., 132 Cal.App.2d 36, 281 P.2d 372 (1955).
Bird v. Press Publishing Co., supra note 12.
Varvaro v. American Agriculturist, Inc., et al. and Lumia v. same, 22 App.Div. 213.
225 N.Y.S. 564 (1927).
Aronson v. Baldwin, 178 Mich. 565, 146 N.W. 206, 58 A.L.R. 1176 (1914).
------75 S.W.2d 905, A.L.R. 1167
World Oil Co., Inc. v. Hicks et al .,.Tex
(1934).
Welch v. Tribune Pub. Co., 83 Mich. 661, 47 N.W. 562 (1890).
Palmer v. New York News Publishing Co., 31 App.Div. 210, 52 N.Y.S. 539 (1898).
Ibid.
Isaac W. Edsall Agt. James Brooks, and others, 33 How.Pr. 191 (N.Y. 1866).
Ibid.
Metropolis Co. v. Croasdell, 145 Fla. 455, 199 So. 658 (1941).
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order to be allowed to prove a failure to retract on the part of the defendant
as evidence of bad faith. When the publisher. of the libel learns of the
falsity of the article through other sources, the courts may still deem that
he has a responsibility to publish a correction, and a failure to do this
can be admitted into evidence to show his malice or bad faith. 24 Evidence
of a publisher's refusal to publish free the statement of others, who are not
implicated in the libel, as to their belief in the innocence of the plaintiff
can be sent to the jury on the question of the good faith of the conduct
of the defendant. 25 While the defendant had no legal obligation to publish
such a belief gratutiously, his refusal in that case tended to disprove an
allegation that his intent was to give the public the true news about the
plaintiff.2 6 If the defendant discovers that other publishers of the same
alleged libel have retracted it, he will be allowed to submit evidence of
any inquiry that he has made as to the reasons he did not also retract. 27
On the other hand, if the defendant prints a retraction even though
the plaintiff has not requested it, he can offer the retraction to mitigate
damages.2 8 This is because the defendant, having libeled the plaintiff,
supposedly has a duty to make a retraction. 29 There is some conflict as to
whether a retraction printed by the defendant, after plaintiff has instituted a
suit against him will be admitted into evidence, and when it is decided that
it will, for what purpose it may be admitted.3 0 The purposes for which it is
admitted are generally limited to those of mitigration of punitive or
exemplary damages which would result from actual malice. 8 ' The usual
test applied for relevancy of evidence in these cases is whether it
tends to disprove a wanton or malicious disposition on the part of the
publisher, but will never reduce the plaintiff's actual or compensatory
damages no matter how praiseworthy the motives of the defendant.32 The
relative value of the retraction under such circumstances usually depends
33
on the promptness of the correction after the suit is filed by the plaintiff.
After the suit was filed, however, an offer made by the defendant to print
the statment of the plaintiff would not be admitted by the Georgia court
to mitigate damages.3 4
In conclusion, the plaintiff in a libel action can show that the defendant failed or refused to retract a libelous publication as evidence of
actual malice on the part of the publisher defendant. Only if there has
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Augusta Chronicle Pub. Co. v. A-rington, 42 Ga. 746, 157 S.E. 394 (1931).
Barnes v. Campbell & a., 60 N.H. 27 (1880).
Ibid.
Bathrick v. Detroit Post and Tribune Co., 50 Mich. 629, 16 N.W. 172, 155 A.L.R.
1353 (1883).
Coffman et al. v. Spokane Chronicle Pub. Co. et al., 65 Wash. 1, 117 Pac. 596 (1911).
Ibid.
Dalziel v. Press Pub. Co., 52 Misc.Rep. 207, 102 N.Y.S. 909, 13 A.L.R. 797 (N.Y.
1906); contra, Byrne v News Corp., 195 Mo.App. 280, 190 S.W. 933 (1916) and
Evening News Association v. Tyron, 42 Mich. 549, 4 N.W. 267 (1880).
Dalziel v. Press Pub. Co. Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Constitution Pub. Co. v. Way, 94 Ga. 120, 21 S.E. 139 (1874).

NOTES
been actual malice may the plaintiff recover punitive damages. There seems
to be no duty on the plaintiff to request a retraction, in the absence of
statutory law on this point, and he still can prove a failure to retract on
the part of the defendant if he can prove that the defendant had actual
knowledge of the falsity of the publication. There seems, therefore, to be
an affirmative duty on the publisher of libelous material to print a
retraction if requested by the person libeled or if he discovers from other
sources that the article is false, as a failure to retract will be evidence of
his bad faith. 35 The laws surrounding retraction should attempt to restore
the reputation of the individual defamed. Often times it appears that the
courts are more concerned with compensating him for the damage to his
reputation. Damages in this unrealistic approach are difficult to ascertain.
A better procedure would seem to be to have the aggrieved individual
request the retraction within a certain time limit after the publication of
the item. The publisher should then draft a retraction, and submit it
to the requester for his approval. Then, upon the publishing of the
retraction so approved, the damages of the defamed person should be
limited to his actual damages, in the absence of proof of a definite intent
on the part of the publisher to knowingly and maliciously attack the
individual. Several states have adopted portions of this proposed solution,
but none have a combination of all of these measures of retraction procedure. However, the problem of two parties who are antagonistic toward
one another will still be encountered, preventing a solution which will be
satisfactory to both parties. A right to reply will run into similar difficulties as the publisher may believe that the reply goes too far considering
the original publication. Such irreconcilable conflicts must still be
resolved by the courts.
ROBERT

J.

HAND

ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY RE FACTS INCLUDED IN
CONFIDENTAL ACCIDENT REPORTS
A statutory privilege has been enacted in most states to the effect that
motor vehicle accident reports made by individuals to the state motor
vehicle department shall be "without prejudice to the individual so reporting."1 Such statutes normally provide that the reports themselves
35.

For an interesting treatment of the laws of retraction from the standpoint of a
newspaper man, see Steigleman, Walter, The Newspaper Man and the Law, 314 ff.
(1915).

1.

E.g., Cal. Veh. Code § 488 (Supp. 1951); Ga. Code Ann § 68-315 (e) (Supp. 1951);
Iowa Code § 321.271 (1950); Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.624 (1952 Supp.); Minn.
Stat. Ann § 169.09(13) (Supp. 1951); Wyo. Comp. Stat. §§ 60-631 (1945), as
amended. The Wyoming statute, which is typical, reads as follows: (a) All accident
reports made by persons involved in accidents shall be without prejudice to the
individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department or
other State agencies having use for the records for accident prevention purposes,
or for the administration of the laws of this State relating to the deposit of security
and proof of financial responsibility by persons driving or the owners of motor

